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Abstract
Standard growth accounting exercises ﬁnd large cross–country diﬀerences in aggre-
gate TFP. Here we ask whether speciﬁc sectors are driving these diﬀerences, and,
if this is the case, which these problem sectors are. We argue that to answer these
questions we need to consider four sectors. In contrast, the literature typically
considers only two sectors. Our four sectors produce services (nontradable con-
sumption), consumption goods (tradable consumption), construction (nontradable
investment), and machinery and equipment (tradable investment). Interacting the
data from the 1996 benchmark study of the Penn World Tables with economic the-
ory, we ﬁnd that the TFP diﬀerences across countries are much larger in the two
tradable sectors than in the two nontradable sectors. This is consistent with the
Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis. We also ﬁnd that within the tradable sectors the
TFP diﬀerences are much larger in machinery and equipment than in consumption
goods. We illustrate the usefulness of our ﬁndings by accounting for the conﬂicting
results of the existing two–sector analyses and by developing criteria for a successful
theory of aggregate TFP.
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One of the major challenges in economics is to account for the huge international dispar-
ity in income. Standard growth accounting exercises ﬁnd that cross–country diﬀerences
in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) cause a sizeable part of the dif-
ferences in GDP per capita.1 This suggests that we need to understand where the TFP
diﬀerences come from. A growing literature addresses this issue and shows that cross–
country diﬀerences in the institutional environment or in policies can cause diﬀerences in
TFP.2 In this paper, we argue that information about the sectoral patterns of TFP dif-
ferences can help to discriminate among the existing theories. We therefore ask whether
speciﬁc sectors are driving the aggregate TFP diﬀerences, and, if this is the case, which
these problem sectors are.
A key challenge in measuring sector TFPs comes from the limited available data.
Unfortunately, disaggregate and comparable data on sector inputs and outputs does not
exist for a wide range of rich and poor countries.3 The only broad source of comparable
and disaggregate cross–country data is the Penn World Tables as provided by Heston et
al. (2002). We will work with the largest and most recent benchmark study from 1996
(PWT96 henceforth), which provides information about expenditures, purchase prices,
and quantities. We will interact this information with economic theory so as to infer
the sector inputs and outputs needed to calculate sector TFPs. Our approach follows
Hsieh and Klenow (2003) in that it utilizes that diﬀerences between sector TFPs lead to
diﬀerences in the observable corresponding relative prices. Our approach extends Hsieh
and Klenow (2003) in that we disaggregate further and pay closer attention to factors
other than TFP diﬀerences that can cause observable relative prices to diﬀer. Moreover,
Hsieh and Klenow (2003) asked the diﬀerent question what can account for the fact that
1See, for example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Hen-
dricks (2002), and Caselli (2004).
2See, for example, Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Parente and Prescott (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001),
Amaral and Quintin (2004), Erosa and Hidalgo (2004), Caselli and Coleman (2005), Herrendorf and
Teixeira (2005a,b) and Cole et al. (2005).
3The McKinsey Global Institute collected ﬁrm level data for a small number of countries, but that
data is not publicly available. The OECD has sector data for many of its members, but poorer countries
are not OECD members.
1across countries investment quantities are strongly positively correlated with income.4
We argue that in order to understand sectoral TFP patterns, it is important to dis-
aggregate to four sectors. In contrast, the literature typically considers only two sectors:
growth theorists distinguish between consumption and investment while trade theorists
distinguish between tradables and nontradables. We come to our view because both con-
sumption and investment have sizeable tradable and nontradable components and the
prices of the tradable relative to the nontradable components vary systematically with
GDP. To the extent that these price variations reﬂect variations in sector TFPs, we can
gain important information from disaggregating consumption and investment into their
nontradable and tradable components. We therefore build a model with the following four
sectors: services (nontradable consumption), consumption goods (tradable consumption),
construction (nontradable investment), and equipment investment (tradable investment).
Since we consider construction and equipment investment separately, another novelty of
our model is that it has two diﬀerent capital stocks, namely the stocks of buildings and
equipment. Our model also pays close attention to two factors other than sector TFP dif-
ferences that can cause relative purchase prices to diﬀer across countries: “taxes” broadly
deﬁned and distribution services. Examples of “taxes” include value–added taxes, tariﬀs,
bribes, and rents from monopoly power. Distribution services are retail, wholesale, and
transport services. Both aﬀect the purchases price but not the producer prices.
Our main ﬁnding is that there are huge cross-country diﬀerences in the TFPs of the
two tradable sectors and considerably smaller cross-country diﬀerences in the TFPs of the
two nontradable sectors. We also ﬁnd that within the tradable sectors, the international
TFP disparities are larger in machinery and equipment investment than in consumption
goods. A successful theory of aggregate TFP ought to be consistent with these ﬁndings.
At this stage, it is not clear to us how well the existing theories do in this respect. They
attribute the cross–country diﬀerences in TFP to exogenous cross–country diﬀerences in
institutions or policies. This raises the question why these exogenous diﬀerences do so
4Caselli and Coleman (2005) is also related to our approach in that they use information about relative
wages to learn about the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.
2much more damage in the tradable sectors than in the nontradable ones.
Here we have abstracted from human capital. It is well known that unmeasured cross–
country diﬀerences in human capital show up as cross–country diﬀerences in TFP, but it
is still hotly debated for how much human capital can account.5 Be that as it may, our
disaggregate four–sector analysis has the testable implication that unmeasured diﬀerences
in human capital should cause the largest TFP diﬀerences in the sectors that have the
largest labor shares. Carefully measuring the capital shares of our four sectors for the U.S.,
it turns out that the labor share in the nontradables is larger than in tradables. While this
speaks against simple theories of human capital, it still leaves room for more sophisticated
ones. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argued that poorer countries ﬁnd it
hard to adopt new technologies because skilled workers that can operate them are scarce.6
If this matters more in the tradable than in the nontradable sectors (for example because
the technologies there are more skill intensive), then unmeasured diﬀerences in human
capital can cause sector TFP diﬀerences that line up with our ﬁndings. Another possibility
is that bad institutions in poorer countries allow rent extraction mainly in the nontradable
sectors, as international competition limits it in the tradable ones. This could distort the
allocation of skilled workers towards the nontradable sectors, in which case unmeasured
diﬀerences in human capital would lead to larger sector TFP diﬀerences in the tradables.
We leave exploring these ideas to future research.
The importance of our four–sector approach is illustrated by comparing our results
to the existing ones. While the literature has produced sound evidence suggesting that
there are problem sectors, it has not produced conclusive evidence as to which these
problem sectors are. For example, many years ago Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)
conjectured that the cross–country diﬀerences in labor productivity are much larger in
the tradable sectors than in the nontradable ones.7 In sharp contrast, Lewis (2004) has
argued recently that the ﬁrm–level evidence collected by the McKinsey Global Institute
5See for example Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994) Mankiw et al. (1992), Blis and Klenow (2000),
Hendricks (2002), Erosa et al. (2005), and Manuelli and Seshadri (2005).
6This is a version of the appropriate–technology hypothesis; see also Basu and Weil (1998).
7Rogoﬀ (1996) oﬀers a review of the literature on the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis. He concludes
that the supporting evidence is surprisingly scant and mostly indirect.
3points to the nontradable sectors as the problem sectors.8 If we use our results and
compute the labor productivities of the aggregate tradables and nontradables categories,
then we conﬁrm the conjecture of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). This suggests
that the results of the McKinsey Studies, which comprise only a relatively small number
of countries, do not generalize to a broad cross section.9
A second group of two–sector analyses identiﬁed completely diﬀerent problem sectors.
On the one hand, Kuznets (1971) found that cross–country diﬀerences in labor produc-
tivity are much larger in agriculture than in the aggregate of the other goods.10 On the
other hand, Hsieh and Klenow (2003) found that cross–country diﬀerences in TFP are
much larger in investment than in consumption. Since agriculture is a part of consump-
tion, these two ﬁndings seem opposite of each other. Our more disaggregate four–sector
explains why they coexist nonetheless. If we aggregate the nontradable consumption and
tradable and nontradable investment and compute the labor productivities of consump-
tion goods and the other goods, we ﬁnd that consumption goods are the problem sector.
In contrast, if we aggregate nontradable and tradable components and compute the sector
TFPs of aggregate consumption and investment, we ﬁnd that investment is the problem
sector. In other words, the explanation for the very diﬀerent results from two–sector
analyses is that sector TFPs diﬀer across countries at a more disaggregate level.
The next section lays out the economic environment. Section 3 deﬁnes the competitive
equilibrium. Section 4 describes our measurement and the calibration of our model. We
report our ﬁndings in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. An appendix contains all
proofs and a detailed description of our data work.
8See also Bailey and Solow (2001).
9To be precise, McKinsey have ﬁrm–level data on 10 countries. The only developing countries in this
data set are India and Brazil.
10More recent related studies include Restuccia et al. (2003), C´ ordoba and Ripoll (2004), and Gollin
et al. (2004).
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There is a ﬁnite set J of small open economies. Time is discrete and runs forever.
All ﬁnal goods are tradable within each country, but they may or may not be tradable
across countries. We call a ﬁnal good tradable if it is tradable across countries and
nontradable if it is not. In each period, there are four ﬁnal goods: nontradable and
tradable consumption and nontradable and tradable investment. For concreteness we
call them services xs, construction of building xb, consumption goods xg, and equipment
investment xe. We denote the set of goods indices by I ≡ {s,b,g,e}. Construction
and equipment investment augment the stocks of buildings kb and equipment ke, which
depreciate at the rates δb,δe ∈ (0,1).11
Each economy j ∈ J is populated by a representative household, whose preferences
are described by the utility function:12
∞ X
t=0
β
tu
 
x
j
st,x
j
gt

. (1)
β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and u has the standard regularity properties. The
representative household is endowed with one unit of labor in each period and with
positive stocks of buildings k
j
b0 and equipment k
j
e0 in the initial period.
All technologies have constant returns to scale. There is no technological progress.
This is without loss of generality here, as we are interested in ratios that along balanced
growth paths are constant and independent of growth rates. Country j ∈ J produces
ﬁnal good i ∈ I according to
y
j
i = F
j
i (k
j
bi,k
j
ei,l
j
i). (2)
kbi and kei are the stocks of buildings and equipment and li is the labor allocated to the
production of yi. F
j
i has the usual regularity properties. Note that F
j
i diﬀers across goods
and countries. We will be more speciﬁc on the nature of these diﬀerences in Subsection
11Note that some authors use the terms “structures and residential housing” and “machinery and
equipment” instead.
12We will specify functional forms below when we do our quantitative exercise.
54.1 below when we specify functional forms.
Tradable output is sold in the world market and delivering it from there to household
requires distribution services. Burstein et al. (2003, 2004) document that the share of
distribution services in the purchase price of tradable goods (the so called distribution
margin) can be large quantitatively.13 To capture this, we assume that the production
function for delivering xi units of tradable good i ∈ {g,e} to the representative household
in country j is given by
x
j
i = Gi(y
∗j
i ,y
j
si), (3)
where y
∗j
i is the quantity of good i that is purchased in the world market and y
j
si are the
distribution services. Gi has the standard regularity properties of a production function.
Again we will be more speciﬁc Subsection 4.1 below.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
We abstract from the possibility that assets are traded across countries. This is with-
out loss of generality because we will restrict our attention to balanced–growth–path
comparisons.
In each period there are markets for each ﬁnal good and each factor of production.
The market clearing conditions are:
p
∗
g(y
∗j
g − y
j
g) + (y
∗j
e − y
j
e) = 0 (4a)
x
j
s + y
j
sg + y
j
se = y
j
s, x
j
b = y
j
b, (4b)
k
j
b =
X
i∈I
k
j
bi, k
j
e =
X
i∈I
k
j
ei, 1 =
X
i∈I
l
j
i, j ∈ J. (4c)
The ﬁrst condition says that trade must be balanced in each country.14 The second
13We do not consider a distribution margin for construction because the IO tables do not report it.
We do not consider a distribution margin for services because distribution services are services.
14Recall that we don’t have borrowing and lending across countries. Recall too that we consider small
open economies, so we do not need to impose world market clearing for the tradable goods.
6condition says that the purchases of services by the household and the distribution sector
must equal the production of services. Note that this implicitly assumes that consumed
services and distribution services are perfect substitutes. The reason for this assumption
is that we do not have information about the relative prices of the two in our data set.
The third condition says that the purchases of new buildings must equal the construction
of buildings. The last three conditions say that the three factors owned by the household
must equal the sums of the quantities rented by the four sectors.
We take into account that “taxes” can be a source of cross-country diﬀerences in
observable relative prices, as suggested by Chari et al. (1996) and Restuccia and Urrutia
(2001). We deﬁne “taxes” broadly as any distortion that increases the purchase price
and gets rebated to the households. Examples include value–added taxes, tariﬀs, bribes,
and monopoly rents. The tax rates are denoted by τ
j
it where i ∈ I and j ∈ J. The tax
revenues are rebated to the households through lump-sum transfers Λ
j
t. The fact that
they are rebated distinguish taxes from sector TFPs: a decrease in a sector’s TFP has
the same eﬀect on the relative price as an increase in the “tax”, but only the tax revenue
gets rebated to the representative household.
We choose equipment in the world market as the numeraire: p∗
e = 1. We denote
the relative world–market price of consumption goods before delivery by p∗
g, the relative
producer prices by p
j
i, the relative purchase prices after delivery and taxes by P
j
i , and the
rental rates by r
j
b, rj
e, and wj where (i,j) ∈ I × J.
For convenience, we deﬁne the following column vectors:
τ ≡ (τs,τb,τg,τe)
0, r ≡ (rb,re)
0, x ≡ (xs,xb,xg,xe)
0, (5a)
P ≡ (Ps,Pb,Pg,Pe)
0, p ≡ (ps,pb,pg,pe)
0, (5b)
k ≡ (kb,ke)
0, ki ≡ (kbi,kei)
0, (5c)
kb ≡ (kbs,kbb,kbg,kbe)
0, ke ≡ (kes,keb,keg,kee)
0, (5d)
y ≡ (ys,yb,yg,ye)
0, l ≡ (ls,lb,lg,le)
0. (5e)
7Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium)
Given sequences of taxes and rebates {τ
j
t,Λ
j
t}∞
t=0 where j ∈ J, a competitive equilib-
rium consists of sequences of relative prices {P
j
t,p∗
g,p
j
t,r
j
t,w
j
t}∞
t=0, household allocations
{x
j
t,k
j
t+1}∞
t=0, ﬁrm allocations {y
j
t,k
j
t,l
j
t}∞
t=0, {x
j
it,y
∗j
it ,y
j
sit}∞
t=0 for i ∈ {g,e} such that:
1. pj
g = p∗
g and pj
e = 1;
2. given prices, {x
j
t,k
j
t+1}∞
t=0 solve the problem of the household in country j:15
max
{x
j
t,k
j
t+1}∞
t=0
∞ X
t=0
β
tu(x
j
st,x
j
gt) (6a)
s.t. (p
j
t)
0 · x
j
t = (r
j
t)
0 · k
j
t + w
j
t + Λ
j
t,
k
j
it+1 = (1 − δi)k
j
it + x
j
it i ∈ {b,e},
x
j
t,k
j
t+1 ≥ 0, k
j
0 > 0 given;
3. given prices, {y
j
it,k
j
it,l
j
it}∞
t=0 solve the problem of the ﬁrm in sector i ∈ I:
max
{y
j
it,k
j
it,l
j
it}
p
j
ity
j
it − (r
j
t)
0 · k
j
it − w
j
tl
j
it s.t. (2); (6b)
4. given prices, {x
j
it,y
∗j
it ,y
j
sit}∞
t=0 for i ∈ {g,e} solve the problems of the ﬁrms in the
distribution sector:
max
{x
j
gt,y
∗j
gt,y
j
sgt}
P
j
gt
1 + τ
j
gt
x
j
gt − (p
∗
gty
∗j
gt + p
j
sty
j
sgt) s.t. (3), (6c)
max
{x
j
et,y
∗j
et ,y
j
set}
P
j
et
1 + τ
j
et
x
j
et − (y
∗j
et + p
j
sty
j
set) s.t. (3); (6d)
5. markets clear, that is, (4) hold.
15Note that proﬁts are zero in competitive equilibrium, so we suppress them.
8Figure 1: The composition of consumption and investment
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4 Data and Measurement
4.1 Deﬁnitions
We work with the PWT96, that is, the 1996 Benchmark Study of the Penn World Tables.
The PWT96 is a fairly disaggregate cross section for 1996, which is collected within
the International Comparisons Program. It contains information about expenditures,
purchased quantities, and purchase prices for 30 categories in 98 countries with more
than 1 million inhabitants.16
We are going to apply our model to three economies: the U.S., Latin America, and
the 20 poorest countries in our sample.17 We represent them by the superscripts US, LA,
and PC, so j ∈ J ≡ {US,LA,PC}. Two remarks about our choice of countries are at
order. First, our small–economy assumption is somewhat questionable for the U.S. We
make it nonetheless because the alternative would be to assume that the world market
clears among our three economies. This is more questionable, as most of U.S. trade is with
countries outside of the set considered here. Second, we calculate the relevant statistics
for Latin America and the Poorest Countries as the averages of the member countries’
statistics. Since we have data only for 1996, we hope that taking averages across broad
sets of countries will eliminate the deviations that individual countries may experience
16We restrict our attention to benchmark years and countries, because only for those the International
Comparisons Program actually collects the data.
17The identity of the Latin American countries and the twenty poorest countries of our sample can be
found in Appendix B.1.
9Figure 2: Prices of nontradables relative to tradables
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from their balanced growth paths. Because of this concern, we do not consider countries
such as India and China, who are typically viewed as being in a transition.
We now aggregate the 30 expenditure categories of the PWT96 to our four sectors. To
do this, we make a judgment about each categories as to whether it is mainly nontradable
or tradable and mainly investment or consumption. The details are described in Appendix
B.1.1. The resulting assignment is very similar to that typically used in other studies; see
for example de Gregorio et al. (1994). Having formed our four sectors, we can provide
the evidence that made us disaggregate to our four, instead of two, sectors.18 Figure 1
shows that both consumption and investment have large nontradable and tradable parts.
Figure 2 shows that for both consumption and investment the prices of the tradable
relative to the nontradable component increase systematically with income. To the extent
that relative prices reﬂect relative sector TFPs, important information should be obtained
from disaggregating consumption and investment into their nontradable and tradable
components. For completeness, Figure 3 in Appendix C also shows the usual way of
reporting relative price variations across countries, namely by looking at the price of
nontradables relative to tradables or by looking at the price of consumption relative to
investment. Both increase systematically with income too.
Next, we need to discuss what happens when countries specialize. A country that spe-
cializes produces only one of the two tradable goods and replaces the domestic technology
18Appendix B.1 explains in detail how to compute the prices and quantities of our four categories.
10for the other tradable good by the world–market technology, so it can obtain the other
tradable good at the world market price. We can avoid dealing with the diﬀerent possible
specialization patterns if we endow each country with the world–market technology of
exchanging the two tradable goods, that is, if we restrict the domestic technologies such
that the marginal rate of transformation between the two tradables equals p∗
g in all coun-
tries. Given this restriction, we can without loss of generality restrict our attention to the
equilibrium in which all countries produce everything themselves, so exports and imports
are zero. While this may seem restrictive, it is easy to show that in any equilibrium (with
or without specialization) the marginal rates of transformation for the operated technolo-
gies equal p∗
g anyways and the following variables are the same: the relative prices, the
consumed and produced quantities of nontradables, the consumed quantities of tradables
and the world productions of tradables, and welfare. In other words, equilibria with dif-
ferent specialization patters only diﬀer with respect to the quantities of tradables that the
diﬀerent countries produce. Since we the PWT96 has no information about the quantities
produced, we do not have nothing to say about them here anyways.
To compute our model, we also need to adopt functional forms. We work with the
following ones:
u(x
j
s,x
j
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α ∈ (0,1) and ¯ xg ∈ (0,∞) are constants that determine the expenditure share of ser-
vices. Since our consumption goods include food and beverages, we interpret ¯ xg as the
subsistence level of consumption goods. Having ¯ xg > 0 allows us to match the fact that
both the relative price of services and the expenditure share of service are much lower
in the poorer countries than in the U.S.. For the same reason, several recent studies,
11including Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Gollin et al. (2004), assumed subsistence terms.
The production function has the standard Cobb–Douglas form in capital and labor, but
here capital is a CES aggregator of the stocks of buildings and equipment. Speciﬁcally,
A
j
i is the TFP of producing yi in country j, θi ∈ (0,1) is the capital share (which pos-
sibly diﬀers across sectors but is restricted to be the same across countries), σ ∈ [0,∞)
is the elasticity of substitution between buildings and equipment, µ ∈ (0,1) determines
the share of buildings in output. The production function of the distribution sector is
Leontief. ψi ∈ (0,∞) determines the distribution services required to deliver one unit of
xi, i ∈ {g,e}.
4.2 Measurement
We now explain how we choose the model parameters and how we measure the “taxes”
and the sector TFPs. We normalize AUS
e = 1. We assume that all “taxes” are zero in
the U.S.: τUS
i = 0 for i ∈ I. This leaves us with 32 parameters. Speciﬁcally, there are
21 technology parameters: the 11 remaining sectoral TFPs; the 4 capital shares; the 2
parameters in the CES–aggregator of buildings and equipment; the 2 parameters of the
distribution technologies; the 2 depreciation rates. Moreover, we have the 3 preference
parameters (namely β, α, and ¯ xg and 8 “taxes” for Latin America and the Poorest
Countries.
We will calibrate 8 of these parameter values to the U.S. economy. These are the
two depreciation rates, the four sector capital shares, and the two parameters of the
distribution technology. Given these 8 values, we will choose the remaining 24 parameter
values so as to match as closely as possible 28 diﬀerent statistics from the PWT96.
Among these 24 parameters are the 11 sectoral TFPs, so what we are doing here really
is an exercise in measurement.
We start by explaining how we calibrate to the U.S. economy. We calculate the sector
capital shares from the U.S. input–output tables of 1997 as reported by the Bureau of
12Economic Analysis (4 statistics).19 This is less straightforward than it might seem at
ﬁrst sight. To begin with, proprietor’s income contains a labor component which needs
to be included in the labor share. Moreover, since our data has no information about
intermediate inputs, we have not modeled them here. This implies that the capital shares
in the model contain the payments to capital that accrue when intermediate inputs are
produced whereas the capital shares in the data shares do not contain these. Appendix
B.1 reports the detailed steps required to take care of this. Following these steps, we ﬁnd
the following capital shares: 0.32 for services, 0.20 for construction, 0.39 for consumption
goods, and 0.31 for equipment. Once we have our methodology in place, it is straightfor-
ward to calculate the capital shares for larger aggregates. This gives: 0.35 for tradables,
0.30 for nontradables, 0.33 for consumption, 0.27 for investment and 0.31 for the whole
economy. Note that we ﬁnd that tradables are more capital intensive than nontradables.
While Bhagwati (1982) and Kravis and Lispsey (1988) suggested that this is the case,
there has been quite some confusion about this. For example, Stockman and Tesar (1995)
claimed that the capital share in non–tradables is higher than in tradables.
We calculate the depreciation rates from the ﬁxed asset and investment data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis by setting the depreciation rate equal to the average of
[xit+kit−kit+1]/kit between 1987-2003 (2 statistics). We ﬁnd that the average depreciation
rates were δb = 0.02 and δe = 0.14. These numbers are somewhat diﬀerent from those
of Greenwood et al. (1997), who had δb = 0.06 and δe = 0.12. The likely reasons for the
diﬀerences are that these authors considered structures but not buildings and that during
the 1990s the BEA changed its way of calculating capital stocks.
We calculate the two distribution margins using the 1997 benchmark IO–tables at
19The data of BEA do not allow us to compute the capital shares for 1996, the year of our cross section
in the PWTs. 1997 is the closest year for which data is available. Note that for each sector in the PWT96
we needed to make a call as to which of our four model sectors it should go. In contrast, we do not need
to make that call in the input–output tables, as they provide more detailed information. In particular,
the counterparts of our four sectors in the input–output tables are as follows: services equal the sale to
ﬁnal expenditure by all sectors except agriculture, mining, manufacturing, personal transportation equip-
ment, and construction; construction equals the construction commodities delivered to ﬁnal expenditure
ﬁxed investment; consumption goods equal the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing commodities not
delivered to ﬁnal expenditure ﬁxed investment; equipment investment equals the agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing commodities delivered to ﬁnal expenditure ﬁxed investment plus the ﬁnal expenditure on
personal transportation equipment.
13producer prices and at purchase prices. One diﬀerence between these two tables is that
the output of the distribution industries (retail and wholesale trade and transportation)
is reported at producer prices whereas at purchase prices it is included in the output of
industries that use them. Using this, we calculate the distribution margins as follows:
we divide the diﬀerence between the shares of ﬁnal expenditures at purchase prices and
at producer prices by ﬁnal expenditure at purchase prices. We ﬁnd that the distribution
margin for consumption goods is 0.46 and for equipment 0.05.20 In equilibrium the two
distribution margins equal P US
s /(P US
g ψg) and P US
s /(P US
e ψg). Using the values for the
distribution margins just calculated and the observed values for P US
s /P US
g and P US
s /P US
e ,
we can solve for ψg,ψe.
Given these eight parameter values, we choose the remaining 24 parameter values so as
to match 28 statistics from the PWT96.21 These are: the ratios of U.S. per–capita GDP
in international prices over Latin American and the Poorest Countries per–capita GDP in
international prices (2 statistics); the three relative prices in each country (9 statistics);
the expenditure shares of services in each country, which we have plotted against income
in Figure 6 in Appendix C (3 statistics); the investment shares of buildings and equipment
in domestic and international prices in each country, which we have plotted against income
in Figures 4–5 in Appendix C (12 statistics). We also use the fact that when multiplied
with the $–market exchange rate as reported by the IMF, the prices of equipment across
countries are unrelated to income. This has been noted by Eaton and Kortum (2001)
and used by Hsieh and Klenow (2003). It can be seen in Figure 7 in Appendix C. Given
P US
e = 1 we therefore impose P LA
e = P PC
e = 1 (2 statistics).
Table 1 summarizes our target statistics in the data and the model. We match all
relative prices by construction. We do a reasonable job at matching the other target
statistics. The only exception are the shares of services in total consumption, which we
20To put these numbers into perspective, Burstein et al. (2003) calculated 0.42 and 0.17. Our distri-
bution margin for equipment investment is signiﬁcantly lower than their number. This is due to the fact
that they focus on the most tradable part of equipment investment (agriculture, mining, and manufac-
turing). To be consistent with the way in which we construct equipment investment in the PWT96, our
equipment investment is all investment other than construction.
21Appendix B.1.2 explains how we compute these statistics. Appendix B.3 explains our minimization
procedure.
14Table 1: Statistics in the Data and the Model
US LA PC
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Income relative to the US 1.00 1.00 3.77 3.82 19.76 19.54
Equip invest share (dom prices) 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
Constr invest share (dom prices) 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10
Equip invest share (int $s) 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.05
Constr invest share (int $s) 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.08
Services expenditure share 0.77 0.62 0.51 0.58 0.34 0.25
Relative price services 1.92 1.92 0.90 0.90 0.36 0.36
Relative price construction 1.21 1.21 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.70
Relative price consumption goods 1.03 1.03 0.82 0.82 0.64 0.64
Distribution margin cons goods 0.46 0.46 – – – –
Distribution margin equipment 0.05 0.05 – – – –
miss by as much as 27%. The reason is that as countries develop the share of consumption
goods remains roughly constant while the shares of services increase and of agricultural
goods decrease. Our model with just two consumption goods is not disaggregate enough
to capture this. To be sure that this does not critically aﬀect our measurement of sector
TFPs, we have also experimented with more complicated utility functions that allow
us to match the three service shares much more closely. It turns out that this does
not importantly change our measurement of the sector TFPs. Since our current utility
function is simpler and commonly used in the development literature, we stick to it.
Table 2: Parameter values
θs = 0.32 θb = 0.20 θg = 0.39 θe = 0.31 δb = 0.02 δe = 0.14
ψg = 36.30 ψe = 4.07 σ = 1.55 µ = 0.46
β = 0.98 α = 0.79 ¯ xg = 0.02
Table 2 summarizes the resulting parameter values. They are fairly standard. Note
15that ¯ xg = 0.02 implies that in the U.S. 4% the consumed quantities of goods are for
subsistence, while in Latin America and the Poorest Countries these numbers are 17% and
70%, respectively. There is one somewhat unexpected problem left: our procedure does
not allow us to identify (τj
s,τ
j
b,Aj
s,A
j
b). More precisely, for each country j ∈ {LA,PC},
we can match all targets equally well for a one–dimensional set of linear combinations of
the four parameters (τj
s,τ
j
b,Aj
s,A
j
b). We will therefore write (τ
j
b(τj
s),Aj
s(τj
s),A
j
b(τj
s)), vary
τj
s, and report the results under the constraint that both τj
s and τ
j
b be non–negative.22
5 Findings
Table 3: Relative aggregate, tradable, and nontradable TFPs for diﬀerent
service taxes
τLA
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
AUS/ALA 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30
AUS
T /ALA
T 3.57 3.54 3.52 3.50 3.48 3.46 3.44 3.43 3.41
AUS
N /ALA
N 1.67 1.68 1.68 1.69 1.69 1.70 1.71 1.71 1.71
τPC
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
AUS/APC 6.00 6.02 6.04 6.06 6.08 6.10
AUS
T /APC
T 13.14 13.08 13.04 13.00 12.95 12.90
AUS
N /APC
N 3.23 3.28 3.32 3.36 3.40 3.44
Our main ﬁndings are summarized in Table 3. To calculate the TFPs of tradables
and nontradables, we aggregate our two tradable goods and our two nontradable goods
using international prices.23 We then ﬁnd that there are much larger diﬀerences in the
TFPs of tradables than of the nontradables. Speciﬁcally, between the U.S. and Latin
22Note that related studies do not experience this indeterminacy because they impose additional re-
striction. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2003) study consumption versus investment and set the tax
on consumption goods to zero.
23For example, given π = (1,1,1,1) the TFP of tradables is:
A
j
T ≡
Aj
g(kj
g)θg(lj
g)1−θg + Aj
e(kj
e)θe(lj
e)1−θe
(k
j
g)θg(l
j
g)1−θg + (k
j
e)θe(l
j
e)1−θe
. (8a)
16America the TFP diﬀerences in the tradables are roughly twice the TFP diﬀerences in
the nontradables. Between the U.S. and the Poorest Countries this number goes up to
four. Table 4 breaks the tradables and nontradables into consumption and investment.
We can see that within the tradables the TFP diﬀerences in equipment are larger than
the TFP diﬀerences in consumption goods. The results for nontradables are too sensitive
to the choice of τs to be able to make robust statements.
To understand why for diﬀerent values of τs, we match all observable statistics equally
well, consider how the other parameters adjust when τj
s increases. Table 4 reports that τ
j
b
and AUS
s /Aj
s go down while AUS
b /A
j
b goes up. The intuition is as follows. As τj
s increases,
purchase prices and produced quantities need to remain the same if no observable statistics
are to change. For the relative price of service to remain the same, the price eﬀect of
the increase in τj
s must be neutralized by a decrease in Aj
s. For the service production
to remain the same, the output eﬀect of the decrease in Aj
s must be neutralized by
reallocating capital and labor from the construction sector to the service sector. For the
output of the construction sector to remain the same, the output eﬀect of this reallocation
must be neutralized by an increase in A
j
b. For the relative price of construction to remain
the same, the price eﬀect of the change in A
j
b must be neutralized by an increase τ
j
b.
In sum, as the taxes change, the TFP of one the two nontradables decreases while the
other one increases. Consequently, there is a lot of action within the nontradables and
little action at aggregate nontradables. We should also mention why the taxes on our
two tradable goods are determinate. The reason is that the producer prices of our two
tradables are equalized across countries. Thus, there is an additional constraint that
pins down the taxes as the diﬀerences between the purchases prices after taking out the
distribution margins and the producer prices in the world market.
At this point it is useful to come back to the possibility that countries specialize.
We compute labor productivity in a similar way. For example, the labor productivity of nontradables is:
LP
j
N ≡
Aj
s(kj
s)θs(lj
s)1−θs + A
j
b(k
j
b)θb(l
j
b)1−θb
l
j
s + l
j
b
. (8b)
.
17Table 4: Relative taxes and sector TFPs for diﬀerent values of τs
τLA
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
τLA
b 7.51 3.63 2.21 1.48 1.04 0.74 0.52 0.36 0.23
AUS
s /ALA
s 1.86 1.81 1.76 1.72 1.68 1.64 1.60 1.56 1.53
AUS
b /ALA
b 0.37 1.01 1.56 2.09 2.59 3.07 3.53 3.97 4.38
AUS
g /ALA
g 3.58 3.55 3.53 3.51 3.49 3.47 3.45 3.43 3.42
AUS
e /ALA
e 4.14 4.11 4.08 4.05 4.03 4.00 3.98 3.96 3.94
τPC
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
τPC
b 10.09 2.68 1.24 0.63 0.29 0.07
AUS
s /APC
s 3.22 3.15 3.08 3.01 2.94 2.88
AUS
b /APC
b 2.06 3.64 4.96 6.35 7.69 8.96
AUS
g /APC
g 13.41 13.36 13.32 13.27 13.22 13.18
AUS
e /APC
e 18.52 18.44 18.37 18.30 18.23 18.16
To avoid dealing with it, we endowed all countries with the world–market technology
of exchanging the two tradable goods for each other. To understand the implications,
suppose for a moment that the poorest countries specialize in consumption goods and
import their equipment from the world market.24 If this is the case, then our measured
sector TFP in equipment is not the TFP which the poor countries produce equipment,
simply because they do not produce any at all. Instead, our measured sector TFP in
equipment is the TFP with which the poor countries obtain equipment in the world
market. This is determined by the TFP of their exports and the price of their imports
relative to their exports. While the poor countries could not possibly have a higher TFP
if they produced equipment themselves (otherwise they would not specialize), they could
well have a lower one. Given the limitations of our data, we cannot say anything about
this.
The importance of our four–sector approach is illustrated by comparing our results to
the existing ones. While the literature has produced sound evidence suggesting that there
are problem sectors, it has not produced conclusive evidence as to which these problem
24Eaton and Kortum (2001) suggest that this may not be a bad approximation.
18Table 5: Relative labor productivities in tradables and nontradables for
diﬀerent τs
τLA
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
LP LA
N /LP LA
N 2.73 2.75 2.76 2.77 2.78 2.80 2.81 2.82 2.83
LP LA
T /LP LA
T 6.43 6.35 6.29 6.23 6.18 6.12 6.07 6.02 5.97
τPC
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
LP PC
N /LP PC
N 9.91 10.01 10.07 10.15 10.23 10.31
LP PC
T /LP T
g 49.72 49.38 49.14 48.84 48.57 48.30
sectors are. Many years ago, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) conjectured that the
cross–country diﬀerences in the labor productivity are much larger in the tradable sectors
than in the nontradable ones. They came to that conjecture because of the systematic
variations of relative prices and real exchange rates with income.25 In sharp contrast,
Lewis (2004) hasa recently argued that the direct ﬁrm–level evidence from McKinsey
studies points to the opposite: the nontradable sectors are the problem sectors.26 What
is more, a group of two–sector analyses identiﬁed completely diﬀerent problem sectors. On
the one hand, Kuznets (1971), Restuccia et al. (2003), Gollin et al. (2004), and C´ ordoba
and Ripoll (2004) documented that cross–country diﬀerences in labor productivity are
much larger in agriculture than in the remaining sectors. To the extent that agricul-
tural goods are tradable, this is consistent with Balassa and Samuelson and inconsistent
with McKinsey. On the other hand, Hsieh and Klenow (2003) found that cross–country
diﬀerences in sector TFP are much larger in investment than in consumption. As our
evidence, their evidence comes from the benchmark studies of Penn World Tables. Since
both investment and consumption contain large tradable and nontradable components,
this is hard to relate to Balassa and Samuelson and McKinsey. Since agriculture is part of
consumption, this seems to opposite to the ﬁnding that agriculture is the problem sector.
To understand the reason for these diﬀerent ﬁndings, we need to aggregate our four
25Rogoﬀ (1996) oﬀers a review of the more recent (indirect) evidence on the Balassa–Samuelson hy-
pothesis.
26See also Bailey and Solow (2001).
19Table 6: Relative labor productivities in consumption goods and the rest
for diﬀerent τs
τLA
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
LP US
g /LP LA
g 6.92 6.83 6.77 6.70 6.64 6.58 6.53 6.48 6.43
LP US
R /LP LA
R 3.20 3.22 3.23 3.24 3.26 3.27 3.28 3.29 3.30
τPC
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
LP US
g /LP PC
g 57.09 56.70 56.42 56.09 55.77 55.46
LP US
R /LP PC
R 19.60 21.38 22.90 24.52 26.09 27.62
sectors to the diﬀerent two–sectors splits considered by the literature. Table 5 reports
the results if we compute the labor productivities for tradables and nontradables.27 The
table conﬁrms the hypothesis of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). This suggests
that the results of the McKinsey Studies, which comprise only a relatively small number
of countries, do not generalize to a broader cross section.28 Table 6 reports the results
if we aggregate nontradable consumption and tradable and nontradable investment into
“the rest” and compute the labor productivities of consumption goods and “the rest”.
We then ﬁnd that the variation is much larger in consumption goods than in the rest. To
the extend that agricultural goods are an important component of tradable consumption
goods, particularly in poorer countries, this is consistent with the view that agriculture is
the problem sector. Finally, Table 7 reports the results if we aggregate into consumption
and investment. We then ﬁnd that the larger variation in sector TFPs lies in investment.
This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Hsieh and Klenow. In sum, the explanation for the
very diﬀerent results from two–sector analyses is that the TFP patterns at our four–sector
level of disaggregation diﬀer widely across countries.
27Again Appendix B.1 explains the details of how to compute aggregate labor productivities.
28To be precise, McKinsey has ﬁrm–level data on 10 countries. The only developing countries in this
set are India and Brazil.
20Table 7: Relative consumption and investment TFPs for diﬀerent τs
τLA
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
AUS
C /ALA
C 2.11 2.05 2.00 1.96 1.91 1.87 1.83 1.80 1.76
AUS
I /ALA
I 1.91 2.32 2.66 3.00 3.32 3.62 3.90 4.17 4.43
τPC
s 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
AUS
C /APC
C 18.87 18.58 18.33 18.08 17.83 17.60
AUS
I /APC
I 20.90 23.33 25.37 27.51 29.55 31.50
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have interacted the 1996 benchmark study of the PWTs with economic
theory in order to measure the cross–country diﬀerences in sector TFPs. We have found
that the cross–country TFP diﬀerences in tradables are much larger than in nontradables.
Since these sector TFP diﬀerences translate into labor productivity diﬀerences, these
ﬁndings support the Balassa and Samuelson hypothesis. We have shown that our ﬁndings
can shed light on the diﬀerent, and often conﬂicting, results that the literature has found
using two–sector analysis.
We think that a successful theory of aggregate TFP ought to be consistent with the
ﬁnding that the tradable sectors are the problem sectors. At this stage, it not clear to
us how well the existing theories do in this respect. For example, one hypothesis is that
poor countries have low TFPs because they have bad institutions [Acemoglu et al. (2001),
Easterly and Levine (2003)]. But this raises the question why these bad institutions do so
much more damage in the tradable sectors. A diﬀerent hypothesis is that poorer countries
are plagued by entry barriers and monopoly rights [Parente and Prescott (1999) and
Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005a)]. Again, this raises the question why monopoly rights
are more prevalent in the tradable sectors. Resolving these important issues is beyond
the scope of the present paper. We suggest it as a fruitful and important area of future
research.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Household ﬁrst–order conditions
Given there are no government expenditure, rebating taxes implies that lump–sum trans-
fers are:
Λt =
τst
1 + τst
Pst

xst +
xgt
ψg
+
xet
ψe

+
τgt
1 + τgt
Pgtxgt +
τbt
1 + τbt
Pbtxbt +
τet
1 + τet
Petxet. (9)
The total expenditure on consumption net of taxes are therefore equal to total income
minus the expenditures on the investment goods:
Ωt ≡
1
1 + τst
Pstxst +

1
1 + τgt
−
τs
1 + τst
Pst
Pgtψg

Pgtxgt (10a)
= rbtkbt + retket + wt −
1
1 + τbt
Pbtxbt −

1
1 + τet
−
τs
1 + τst
Pst
Petψe

Petxet. (10b)
26The ﬁrst–order conditions to problem (6a) imply:
Pst
Pgt
=
α
1 − α
xgt − ¯ xg
xst
, (11a)
1
Pst

xgt − ¯ xg
xst
1−α
= β
1
Pst+1

xgt+1 − ¯ xg
xst+1
1−α (1 − δe)Pet+1 + ret+1
Pet
, (11b)
(1 − δe)Pet+1 + ret+1
Pet
=
(1 − δb)Pbt+1 + rbt+1
Pbt
. (11c)
Solving (11a) for Pstst yields
Pstxst =
α
1 − α
[Pgtxgt − Pgt¯ xg]
Substituting this into (10a) and rearranging, we get expressions that will prove useful
when we compute the model:
Pgtxgt =
1 − α
1−α
1+τgt + 1
1+τst

α − (1 − α)Pstτst
Pgtψg


Ωt + Pgt¯ xg
α
1−α
1
1+τst

, (12a)
Pstxst =
α
1−α
1+τgt + 1
1+τst

α − (1 − α)Pstτst
Pgtψg


Ωt + Pgt¯ xg

1
1+τst
Pstτst
Pgtψg − 1
1+τgt

. (12b)
A.2 Steady state prices and quantities
Step 1. Firms take producer prices pi as given. Solving their maximization problems
with respect to labor, buildings and equipment gives:
w = (1 − θi)piAi

ki
li
θi
, (13a)
rb = θipiAi

ki
li
θi−1
µ
1
σ

ki
kbi
 1
σ
, (13b)
re = θipiAi

ki
li
θi−1
(1 − µ)
1
σ

ki
kei
 1
σ
. (13c)
Step 2. We express the two capital–labor ratios and the composite–capital–labor ratio
as functions of the interest rates, which in steady state are readily computed from the
27Euler equations. (13b) and (13c) imply
kei
kbi
=

rb
re
σ 1 − µ
µ
.
Substituting this into (7c) and rearranging leads to
rb
r
=

µ
ki
kbi
 1
σ
, (14a)
re
r
=

(1 − µ)
ki
kei
 1
σ
, (14b)
where
r ≡

µr
1−σ
b + (1 − µ)r
1−σ
e
 1
1−σ . (15)
Plugging (14a) into (13b), we obtain:
ki
li
=

θipiAi
r
 1
1−θi
. (16a)
Substituting (16a) into (14a) and (14b) and rearranging leads to:
kbi
li
= µ

r
rb
σ 
θipiAi
r
 1
1−θi
, (16b)
kei
li
= (1 − µ)

r
re
σ 
θipiAi
r
 1
1−θi
. (16c)
Step 3. We now derive the producer prices. Equation (13a) and (13b) together with
(14a) imply that
1 − θe
θe
ke
le
=
1 − θi
θi
ki
li
. (17)
Plugging (16a) into (17) and using that pe = 1, we obtain:
pi =
r
θiAi

θeAe
r
 1−θi
1−θe 
1 − θe
θe
θi
1 − θi
1−θi
(18)
28for i ∈ I.
This allows us to rewrite (16a)–(16c) into:
ki
li
=
1 − θe
θe
θi
1 − θi

θeAe
r
 1
1−θe
, (19a)
kbi
li
= µ
1 − θe
θe
θi
1 − θi

r
rb
σ 
θeAe
r
 1
1−θe
, (19b)
kei
li
= (1 − µ)
1 − θe
θe
θi
1 − θi

r
re
σ 
θeAe
r
 1
1−θe
. (19c)
It is important to point out that with this we expressed the capital-labor ratios as a
function of parameters and purchase prices because (12a) and (12b) imply in the steady
state that
re =
1 − β(1 − δe)
β
Pe (20a)
rb =
1 − β(1 − δb)
β
Pb, (20b)
and (15) states that r depends on re and rb.
Step 4. We now derive the purchase prices, which we denote by capital letters. They
satisfy
Ps = ps(1 + τs), (21a)
Pb = pb(1 + τb), (21b)
Pg =

pg +
Ps
ψg

(1 + τg), (21c)
Pe =

1 +
Ps
ψe

(1 + τe). (21d)
29Combining these with (18) leads to
Ps
1 + τs
=
r
θsAs

θeAe
r
 1−θs
1−θe 
1 − θe
θe
θs
1 − θs
1−θs
, (22a)
Pb
1 + τb
=
r
θbAb

θeAe
r
 1−θb
1−θe 
1 − θe
θe
θb
1 − θb
1−θb
, (22b)
Pg
1 + τg
=
r
θgAg

θeAe
r
 1−θg
1−θe 
1 − θe
θe
θg
1 − θg
1−θg
+
Ps
ψg
, (22c)
Pe
1 + τe
= 1 +
Ps
ψe
. (22d)
Step 5. Next, we determine li by using market clearing. Note that so far we did not use
any steady state conditions, but we will now. The market clearing conditions in steady
state are
X
i∈I
li = 1,
δe
X
i∈I

kei
li

li = Ae

ke
le
θe
le,
δb
X
i∈I

kbi
li

li = Ab

kb
lb
θb
lb,
1
Pgt
(1 − α)

Ωt + α
1−α
Pgt¯ xg
1+τst

1−α
1+τgt + 1
1+τst

α − (1 − α)Pstτst
Pgtψg
 = Ag

kg
lg
θg
lg.
where Ω is the steady state version of (10b)
Ω =

rb −
Pbδb
1 + τb
X
i∈I
kbi +

re −
Peδe
1 + τe
+
τsPsδe
(1 + τs)ψe
X
i∈I
kei + w
with
X
i∈I
kei =
Ae
δe

ke
le
θe
le,
X
i∈I
kbi =
Ab
δb

kb
lb
θb
lb.
30The equilibrium conditions can be turned into a linear system of equations.
1 = le + lb + lg + ls,
Ae

ke
le
θe
le = δe

kee
le

le + δe

keb
lb

lb + δe

keg
lg

lg + δe

kes
ls

ls,
Ab

kb
lb
θb
lb = δb

kbe
le

le + δb

kbb
lb

lb + δb

kbg
lg

lg + δb

kbs
ls

ls,
Ag

kg
lg
θg
lg =
1
Pg
1 − α
1−α
1+τgt + 1
1+τst

α − (1 − α)Pstτst
Pgtψg

"
rb −
Pbδb
1 + τb

Ab
δb

kb
lb
θb
lb
+

re −
Peδe
1 + τe
+
τsPsδe
(1 + τs)ψe

Ae
δe

ke
le
θe
le + (1 − θe)Ae

ke
le
θe
+
α
1 − α
Pg¯ xg
1 + τst
#
.
We can solve this system of linar equation for the allocation of labor. Since the capital-
labor ratios are the functions of the real interest are, purchase prices and parameters, the
labor allocation is a function of real interest are, purchase prices and parameters, and
taxes. We use this to express the quantities consumed and invested as the function of the
same variables. We use these functions in the calibration where for the purchase prices
we substitute the observed once.
Appendix B. Data
Appendix B.1 Data description and measurement
The benchmark study of the Penn World Tables 1996 (PWT96) has 115 countries and
31 goods categories. We exclude all countries with less one million inhabitants, namely
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Fiji,
Grenada, Iceland, Luxembourg, Qatar, Swaziland, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Grenadines. Moreover, we exclude Mongolia because it reports zero
equipment investment. This leaves 98 countries, which in this appendix we index by
j ∈ {1,...,98}.
31Appendix B.1.1 Goods categories and countries
We aggregate the 30 goods categories into four aggregate categories: services, construc-
tion, consumption goods, and equipment investment. We denote the sets of goods in each
of these four aggregate categories by (Gs,Gb,Gg,Ge), the quantities by xj = (xj
s,x
j
b,xj
g,xj
e),
and the prices in domestic currency by e pj = (e pj
s, e p
j
b, e pj
g, e pj
e).29 Quantities are in interna-
tional prices, as reported by the PWT96 in Input–Table 4.5. They are aggregated by
adding them up. Put diﬀerently, expressing quantities in international prices is a trans-
formation of units such that the new international prices are ones: π = (1,1,1,1).
We now describe how we aggregate the 30 data categories into our four model cat-
egories. We set the model–category nontradable investment equal to the data–category
construction. We set the model–category tradable investments equal to the data–categories
personal transportation equipment and machinery and equipment. Changes in stocks
contain both tradable and nontradable parts. We split this category by assuming that
its nontradable share equals the share of construction in investment without changes of
stocks.
We continue with the model categories tradable and nontradable consumption. We set
the model–category nontradable consumption equal to the data categories gross rent and
water charges, medical and health services, transportation, communication, recreation
and culture, education, restaurants/cafes and hotels. We set the model–category tradable
consumption equal to the data–categories food, beverages, tobacco, clothing and footwear,
fuel and power, furniture and ﬂoor coverings, other household goods, household appliances
and repairs. The data–category other goods and services contains both tradable and
nontradable parts. We split it by assuming that its nontradable share equals the share of
the nontradable consumption goods assigned thus far in all consumption goods assigned
thus far.
We use average statistics from the Latin American and the twenty poorest countries
in the PWT96. The Latin American countries of our sample are Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru,
29Note that we normalize e pj
e = 1 in the model. It is convenient not to do this yet at this point.
32Panama, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. The twenty poorest
countries of our sample are Tanzania, Malawi, Yemen, Madagascar, Zambia, Mali, Tajik-
istan, Nigeria, Benin, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Congo, Bangladesh, Nepal, Senegal, Vietnam,
Pakistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and Moldova. Both sets of countries are reported here
in the order of increasing real GDPs per capita.
Appendix B.1.2 Deﬁnitions of statistics used
We ﬁrst describe how to aggregate within a country. Total expenditures on all 30 cate-
gories in country j ∈ {1,....,98} can be expressed either in domestic or in international
prices:
e p
j · x
j ≡
30 X
i=1
e p
j
ix
j
i,
π · x
j ≡
30 X
i=1
πix
j
i.
The PWT96 refer to e p
j
ix
j
i as expenditure in national currency (Input–data 4.1) and to
πix
j
i as quantities in international dollars (Input–data 4.5).
Since our model economy does not have borrowing and lending, in the model these
expenditure must equal GDP. This is not the case in the PWT96 where GDP in domestic
and in international prices are deﬁned as:
GDP
j(e p
j) ≡ e p
j · x
j + NFB
j(e p
j),
GDP
j(π) ≡ π · x
j + NFB
j(π).
NFBj stands for net foreign balance.
Within country j, the prices of each of the four model categories i ∈ {s,g,b,e} are
the ratios of the expenditures in domestic currency and quantities in international prices
33in that category:
e p
j
i =
P
ι∈Gi e pj
ιxj
ι P
ι∈Gi πιx
j
ι
.
Note that given quantities in international $s, the price can also be written as the weighted
average of the prices of all elements in that category where the relative weights are the
relative quantities in international $s:
e p
j
i =
X
ι∈Gi
 
πιxj
ι P
ν∈Gi πνx
j
ν
!
e pj
ι
πι
.
The relative prices are:
p
j
i ≡
e p
j
i
e p
j
e
.
We now explain how we aggregate across countries. Let CLA and CPC denote the
individual countries in the two subgroups. The average construction and equipment
investment shares in international prices in one of the two subgroups of countries are easy
to ﬁnd because we can still add quantities in international prices from diﬀerent countries.
So, for i ∈ {b,e} and j ∈ {LA,PC}:
π
j
ix
j
i
πj · xj ≡
P
ι∈Cj πixι
i P
ι∈Cj π · xι.
The methodology underlying the PWT96 does not imply how to aggregate variables across
countries when the variables are in domestic prices. Since we cannot add up variables
that are in diﬀerent units, we aggregate only unit–free variables such as ratios or relative
prices. For quantity ratios we use arithmetic averages because they add up to one (but
are not transitive), whereas for relative prices we use geometric averages because they
are transitive. For i ∈ {b,e} and j ∈ {LA,PC} the average construction and equipment
34shares in domestic prices are:
p
j
ix
j
i
pj · xj ≡
X
ι∈Cj

πι · xι
P
ν∈Cj πν · xν

pι
ixι
i
pι · xι.
The average service share in consumption expenditure in domestic prices is:
pj
sxj
s
p
j
sx
j
s + p
j
gx
j
g
≡
X
ι∈Cj

πsxι
s + πgxι
g P
ν∈Cj πsxν
s + πgxν
g

pι
sxι
s
pι
sxι
s + pι
gxι
g
.
The average relative price for good i ∈ {s,g,b} is:
p
j
i ≡ exp
 
X
ι∈Cj

πι · xι
P
ν∈C πν · xν

ln(p
ι
i)
!
.
Here, we use relative GDPs (and not relative expenditure on category i) as the weights
because that preserves transitivity.
Appendix B.2 Calculating sector capital shares
Appendix B.2.1 Capital shares for each industry
To calculate the capital shares for the sectors of our model, we ﬁrst determine how to
split the value added in each industries into capital and labor income. Then we aggregate
the industries to the four sectors of our model. Finally, we calculate the capital shares of
the four sectors.
We use the 1997 benchmark Input–Output Tables (IO Tables) for the U.S. from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). They report the value added of each industry as the
sum of the compensation of employees, indirect business tax and nontax liabilities, and
other value added. Other value added is also called gross operating surplus. It mostly
contains capital income, but one of its components, “Other gross operating surplus –
noncorporate” (or “proprietors’ income”), contains also labor income. Since we do not
have information about how much labor income is contained in proprietors’ income, we
assume that its share equals the industry–wide average share of labor income. Thus, we
35calculate the payments to capital and labor in industry i as:
Vil ≡ COMPi +
COMPi
COMPi + GOSi − OGOSNi
OGOSNi, (26a)
Vik ≡ GOSi −
COMPi
COMPi + GOSi − OGOSNi
OGOSNi. (26b)
COMPi stands for compensation of employees, GOSi for operating surplus (or other
value added), and OGOSNi for other gross operating surplus – noncorporate.
The IO–tables report COMPi and GOSi but not OGOSNi. We use the BEA’s “GDP–
by–Industry” data to estimate OGOSNi, which is available for 1998–2003. A minor
complication is that the “GDP–by–Industry” Data is at the three–digit level whereas the
benchmark IO Tables are at the four–digit level. We deal with this as follows. Let j be
an industry index at the three digit level and ij be an industry index at the four digit
level such that the four–digit industry i is part of the three–digit industry j. First, we
calculate the time average of (OGOSN/GOS)j for each industry j. Then, we assume
that OGOSNij/GOSij = (OGOSN/GOS)j for each ij and estimate OGOSNij as
OGOSNij = GOSij

OGOSN
GOS

j
.
Appendix B.2.2 Capital shares for model sectors
We now explain our aggregation procedure in two steps. We ﬁrst describe how one can
calculate the capital and labor share of a particular type of ﬁnal expenditure. We then
explain how to construct the four ﬁnal expenditure categories that corresponds to the
four sector of our model.
The IO–tables of BEA comes with a “use” and a “make” matrix. Let B be the
(m×n) “use” matrix. Entries in each column show the amount of a commodity used by
an industry per unit of output of that industry. Let D be the (n × m) “make” matrix.
Entries in each column show, for a given commodity, the proportion of the total output
of that commodity produced in each industry.30
30We use the notation of the BEA.
36Let 1 be a column vector with all of its elements equal 1. Its size may vary from
formula to formula so as to ensure that the matrix operation is well deﬁned. Now we
have the following identities:
q = Bg + E1, (27a)
g = Dq, (27b)
where q is the (m×1) commodity output vector, g is the (n×1) industry output vector,
and E is the (m×k) vector of ﬁnal expenditures where k is the number of diﬀerent types
of ﬁnal expenditures. We can write e = E1 for the GDP vector.
Combining the ﬁrst and the second identity leads to:
g = D(I − BD)
−1e, (28)
where I is the identity matrix. The BEA calls D(I−BD)−1 the industry–by–commodity
total requirements matrix. It shows the industry output required per unit delivered to
ﬁnal users. In particular, element zij of the total requirements matrix shows how much
output of industry j is required to deliver one unit of commodity i to ﬁnal users. Note that
zij does not only include the direct eﬀect of ﬁnal expenditure on industry output, but also
all direct and indirect eﬀects from other industries. Hence the name total requirement
matrix. Consequently, vector zi shows how much industry output has to be produced so
that one unit of commodity i can be sold to ﬁnal expenditure.
Let gi be the i–th element of g, thus the output of industry i. Moreover, let v0
l =
(Vil/gi) and v0
k = (Vik/gi) be the (1 × m) row vectors of labor and capital income shares
in industry output where Vil and Vik have been calculated according to (26). Then the
labor and capital incomes associated with GDP vector e are deﬁned as


vl
vk

 =


v0
l
v0
k

D(I − BD)
−1e.
37This can be used to calculate the capital share for GDP.
The same principle can be used to calculate the capital and labor incomes associated
with any ﬁnal expenditure vector. This is because the total requirements matrix can
be multiplied by any expenditure vector to calculate the industry output requirement to
sell that ﬁnal expenditure vector. Note the we do not need to calculate D(I − BD)−1
because the BEA publishes all total requirements matrices. In our calculations we used
the industry-by-commodity total requirements matrix.
Now we describe how we construct the four sectors corresponding to our model. We
ﬁrst aggregate ﬁnal expenditures excluding net exports into consumption and investment.
The sale of commodity i to ﬁnal consumption is made up by personal and government
consumption expenditures. The sale of commodity i to ﬁnal investment expenditures
is made up by private and government ﬁxed investment expenditures plus changes in
private inventories. In addition, we classify the sale of transportation equipment (three
digit NAICS code 336) and the sale of commodities in construction (two digit NAICS
code 23) as investments. Finally, we assume that the consumption and investment shares
in net exports equal the industry wide average. This procedure leads to consumption and
investment commodity vectors xC and xI that add up to the GDP vector.
Next, we classify each commodity as tradable or non-tradable. We classify all com-
modities sold to investment as tradable except for construction commodities, which we
classify as non-tradable investment. We classify all commodities sold to consumption
with a three digit NAICS code higher or equal to 420 as non-tradable. This includes
all industries which are producing commodities traditionally viewed as services. In addi-
tion, we classify all commodities with the two–digit NAICS code 22 sold to consumption
as non-tradable. These are the utilities (distribution of electric power, natural gas and
water). Finally, we classify government services as non-tradables.
This procedure deﬁnes four ﬁnal expenditure vectors nontradable services xs, non-
tradable construction xb, tradable goods xg, and tradable equipment xe. These vectors
satisfy xC = xs + xg, xI = xe + xb, and xC + xI = e with 10e = GDP where 10 is a
38row vector. The capital and labor incomes of the four ﬁnal expenditure vectors are now
easily calculated:


vls vlb vlg vle
vks vkb vkg vke

 =


v0
l
v0
k

D(I − BD)
−1[xs,xb,xg,xe]. (29)
Given this, we can calculate the capital share for ﬁnal expenditure category i as vki/(vki+
vli).
Appendix B.3 Computing the model
We can calibrate some parameters directly. We start with the sector TFPs in the U.S. To
calculate them, we use that without taxes the equilibrium purchase price of equipment
must satisfy:
P
US
e = 1 +
P US
s
ψe
.
Rearranging this, we obtain:
P
US
e =
ψe
ψe − (P US
s /P US
e )
.
Since we have already calculated ψe and since P US
s /P US
e is observable, this uniquely pins
down P US
e . Given we observe P US
i /P US
e for i ∈ {s,b,g}, we can now calculate the other
three purchase prices. Moreover, in equilibrium the purchase price of consumption goods
must satisfy:
P
US
g = p
∗
g +
P US
s
ψg
.
Using the purchase prices just calculated and the value of ψg, this implies the value of p∗
g.
Since AUS
e /AUS
g = 1/AUS
g = p∗
g and AUS
i /AUS
g = P US
i /p∗
g for i ∈ {s,b}, this also pins down
AUS
g and AUS
s ,AUS
b (3 parameters and 3 statistics).
We continue with Latin America and the Poorest Countries, so j ∈ {LA,PC}. We
know that Aj
e/Aj
g = p∗
g (2 parameters). Using the restriction P US
e = P j
e and the observed
39relative purchase prices, we can calculate the purchase prices. Since
P
j
e = (1 + τ
j
e)

1 +
P j
s
ψe

, (30a)
P
j
g = (1 + τ
j
g)

p
∗
g +
P j
s
ψg

, (30b)
this pins down the values of τj
g,τj
e (6 parameters and 8 statistics).
At this point, we are left with 15 parameters. We calibrate them jointly by minimizing
the squared percentage deviations of the model statistics from the following 17 observed
statistics of the PWT96: the U.S. over the other two per–capita GDPs in international
prices (2 statistics), the 4 investment shares of buildings and equipment in domestic
prices and international prices in each country (12 statistics), and the shares of services
in consumption expenditure in each country (3 statistics).
40Appendix C. Figures
Figure 3: Relative Purchase Prices
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
Log of per capita GDP at international $s
P
r
i
c
e
o
f
n
o
n
-
t
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
s
o
v
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
o
f
t
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
s
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Log of per capita GDP at international $s
P
r
i
c
e
o
f
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
o
f
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
Figure 4: Construction–investment shares
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Figure 5: Equipment–investment shares
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41Figure 6: Services shares in consumption expenditure at domestic prices
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Log of per capita GDP at international $s
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
i
n
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
a
t
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
p
r
i
c
e
s
Figure 7: Purchase Prices of Equipment in U.S. $s
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